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ABSTRACT
We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and
consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a less degree richer states, have less
corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like education in 1928 or
Congregationalism in 1890, as instruments for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption
is weakly correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated
with  the  size  of  government.  There  is  a  weak  negative  relationship  between  corruption  and
employment and income growth. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view
that  the  correlation  between  development  and  good  political  outcomes  occurs  because  more













I.  Introduction 
 
Corruption isn’t just something that happens to poor countries.  Between 1990 and 2002, 
federal prosecutors convicted more than 10,000 government officials of acts of official 
corruption, such as conflict of interest, fraud, campaign-finance violations, and 
obstruction of justice.  Recently, the governors of both New Jersey and Connecticut have 
had to resign amidst allegations of corrupt practices.  The past three insurance 
commissioners of Louisiana have been convicted for official misdeeds (Corporate Crime 
Reporter, 2004).  America’s past is even more sordid (see Glaeser and Goldin, 2004).  
City leaders like William M. Tweed engaged in practices that would look at home in the 
most corrupt nations today. 
 
But if America’s corruption is bad news for the country, it is a mixed blessing for 
economists studying corruption.  Cross-national research on corruption has been forced to 
rely on opinion surveys that ask private individuals about the levels of corruption in a 
nation.  Empirical work using these surveys has established the perceived corruption 
increases with ethnic fragmentation, and that there is a strong negative corruption 
between perceived corruption and investment and a weak negative correlation between 
perceived corruption and growth (Mauro, 1995).  LaPorta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1999) confirm that more fractionalized countries are more corrupt and also 
document a strong relationship between economic development and corruption.   
 
While these opinion surveys contain valuable information, there are many reasons why 
skeptics might doubt their accuracy.  Some of the most exciting work on corruption has 
used within country data on bribery by firms (Svensson, 2003) and politicians (McMillan 
and Zoido, 2004).  These studies are, however, poorly suited for asking the basic 
questions about what national characteristics cause corruption and what is the impact of 
corruption on economic development. 
 Because there is corruption within the U.S. and because corruption differs across states, it 
is possible to use cross-state variation to address both of these questions.  The negative 
aspects of using cross-state variation are obvious.  No state today is as poor or as corrupt 
as many countries in the developing world, and so relying on variation across the states in 
the US limits research to a small part of the distribution of both independent and 
dependent variables.  
 
However, cross-state variation does have one significant advantage.  We actually have a 
hard measure of corruption— Federal convictions of government officials for corrupt 
practices.
1  These conviction levels capture the extent to which Federal prosecutors have 
charged and convicted public officials for misconduct in each of the fifty states.  The 
usual problem with using conviction rates to measure corruption is that in corrupt places, 
the judicial system is itself corrupt and fewer people will be charged with corrupt 
practices.  This problem is mitigated when focusing on Federal convictions, because the 
Federal judicial system is relatively constant across space and isolated from local 
corruption.  In this paper, we use the number of Federal corruption convictions by state to 
ask what state characteristics predict corruption and whether corruption appears to deter 
economic growth at the state level. 
 
We test three theories about the causes of corruption.  The first hypothesis, based loosely 
on Lipset (1960), is that places with higher levels of income and education are less 
corrupt.  The key element of this hypothesis is that voters with more education and 
income are more willing and able to monitor public employees and to take action when 
these employees violate the law.  A second hypothesis, connected with Mauro (1995) and 
Alesina, Bagir and Easterly (2002), is that ethnic heterogeneity increases corruption.  As 
voters become more diverse along ethnic or income lines, then voting will inevitably 
focus on redistribution rather than on the honesty of government officials.  The third 
hypothesis that we test is that places with more government revenues or regulations will 
                                                 
1 Fisman and Gatti (2001) and Berkowitz and Clay (2003) also use state conviction data to test theories of 
corruption. have higher levels of corruption, as these places will have more assets to steal and more 
rules to subvert. 
 
We find significant support for the first hypothesis.   States that are richer and better 
educated are less corrupt.  The impact of education on corruption is much stronger and 
more robust. To address the problem that corruption might reduce education, we use state 
high school graduation rates in 1928 (from Goldin, 1998) and find that this also predicts 
less corruption today.   If we use congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for 
schooling, we still find that places with more schooling are less corrupt.   
 
We also find that racial heterogeneity, especially percent African-American, increases 
corruption, although this effect is less robust.  There is little relationship between income 
inequality and corruption.  Finally, we find no evidence whatsoever linking bigger 
government or more regulation with more corruption.  However, as states may be less 
likely to support a larger government if it is corrupt, this lack of correlation may reflect 
reverse causality.     
 
Finally, we turn to the connection between state growth and corruption.  We regress 
growth in population, income and housing values between 1990 and 2000 on the average 
number of corruption convictions in that state during that period.  More corrupt places 
experienced slower income and employment growth in the 1990s.  However, this effect 
becomes statistically insignificant once we control for other factors that limit growth and 
are correlated with corruption. 
 
In all, the results from state-level regressions are remarkably similar to those at the 
country level.  Per capita income, education and ethnic heterogeneity all predict more 
corruption.  There is no empirical link between bigger government, or more regulation, 
and more corruption.  There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and 
economic growth at the state or country level.  The fact that these findings exist both at 
the country level using opinion surveys, and at the state level, using conviction data, lends further support to the validity of both ways of measuring corruption and that 
corruption declines with income and education and rises with ethnic heterogeneity.   
 
II.  The Determinants of Corruption 
 
This paper will address both the causes and consequences of corruption, but in this 
section, we review only the potential causes of corruption because the reasons why 
corruption might limit growth are better understood (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 
Ehrlich and Lui, 1999).   If corruption is defined as crimes by public officials for personal 
gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1975), then the economic theory of corruption should follow 
closely the economic theory of crime (Becker, 1968).  The potential criminal, in this case 
a government official, weighs the benefits of crime against its costs.  National or state 
characteristics will influence the level of corruption as they alter the benefits and costs of 
crime. 
 
The benefits of corruption come from government actors being able to allocate resources, 
including the right to bypass certain regulations, to private individuals.  As such, the 
benefits to a political actor from being corrupt should be increasing in the size of 
government and in the individual’s discretion over government actions.  Greater numbers 
of regulations also increase the opportunities for helping private actors evade these 
regulations, therefore increasing the possibilities for bribe taking.   The size of the 
economy can increase the returns to bypassing regulations or to corrupting the legal 
system (as in Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003).  Therefore, we will test whether states with 
bigger governments and more regulation have more corruption.   
  
The costs of corruption are driven by the probability of being caught and the penalties 
from being caught, which include imprisonment, electoral defeat and loss of reputation.  
We focus on two factors that have been the focus of the literature on corruption: 
economic development and heterogeneity. 
 While the modern literature on corruption began with work on whether corruption makes 
countries poor (e.g Mauro, 1995), it is also reasonable to ask whether poor countries 
naturally tend towards corruption (as in Lipset, 1960, Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopes-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer, 2004).  Empirical research has shown that political involvement rises with 
income and education.  This positive relationship may be because political attention is a 
luxury good, or because education makes it easier to learn about politics.  Furthermore, 
education may indoctrinate individuals towards having a higher value of staying 
politically involved.  As a result, places with richer and more educated citizens may have 
people who are more willing to pay attention to corrupt activities and who are better able 
to take action against these officials.  Higher levels of income and education will also 
increase the ability of private individuals to punish malfeasance by members of the 
government.   
 
One problem with testing whether income and education decrease corruption is that these 
variables might themselves be functions of the quality of government.  Long standing 
corruption might induce capital to flee and reduce the quality of schools.  While there are 
no perfect solutions to this problem, we will address it by using long-standing variables 
that relate to education and wealth, such as the fraction of Congregationalist churches in 
1850 and high school graduation rates in 1928.   Both of these variables continue to 
predict schooling to this day, and we believe that they are otherwise uncorrelated with 
modern-day corruption.  However, skeptics might be concerned that these variables 
might themselves have been determined by historical levels of corruption, and that these 
levels of corruption have persisted over time.  While we do not have a strong defense 
against that view, our reading of historical commentators, like Steffens (1904) suggests 
that corruption was ubiquitous 100 years ago and that the characterization of corruption 
across states historically does not always line up with differences in corruption today (see 
also Glaeser and Goldin, 2004).   
 
Another set of theories on the determinants of corruption has focused on the effect of 
ethnic fragmentation on corruption and wasteful redistribution (Mauro, 1995 and Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 2002).  Ethnic fragmentation impacts corruption by reducing the popular will to oppose corrupt politicians.   If an area is torn apart by ethnic divisions and 
leaders tend to allocate resources towards backers of their own ethnicity, then members 
of one ethnic group might continue to support a leader of their own ethnic group, even if 
he is known to be corrupt.  American history is replete with examples of ethnic groups 
supporting leaders, like James Michael Curley or Marion Barry, even when those leaders 
are in jail.  Other forms of division, such as income inequality, may also reduce voters’ 
desire to oppose corruption.  To test this hypothesis, we will examine the effects of ethnic 
heterogeneity and income inequality on corruption.      
 
III.  The Empirical Determinants of State Level Corruption 
 
We begin this section by describing our data, and then turn to testing the relationships 





Our corruption data is derived from the Justice Department’s “Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.”  This publication lists the 
number of federal, state and local public officials convicted of a corruption-related crime 
by state.  We combine information reported in the 1999-2002 reports in order to calculate 
the total number of convictions in each state between 1990 and 2002.  Following a 
strategy similar to the Corporate Crime Reporter (2004), we then divide these convictions 
by average state population from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses to form an estimate of the 
state conviction rate per capita.
2  The conviction levels, state population averages, and 
conviction rates are shown for every state in Appendix Table 1.  On average, about 4 
public officials for every 100,000 people were convicted of corruption during the 13-year 
time span.  There is a fairly wide degree of variation across states, as the standard 
deviation is 2.1 convictions per 100,000. 
                                                 
2 The conviction rates are also adjusted to account for a few states for which convictions were not reported 
in a few years.  In these cases, we divide the observed corruption rate by the fraction of non-missing 
observations for that state.  
The crimes investigated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) include a wide array of 
topics such as conflict of interest, fraud, campaign-finance violations, and obstruction of 
justice.  While the majority of public corruption cases are handled by the local US 
attorney’s office, the DOJ prosecutes about 2,000 cases per year.  These cases are 
generally brought to the attention of the DOJ through four main channels.  First, some 
cases are referred to the DOJ for federal prosecution if they involve individuals with 
close ties to local government, thereby making it inappropriate for them to be tried by the 
local US attorney’s office.  The DOJ also handles cases that involve multiple 
jurisdictions.  Third, federal agencies can directly refer questionable behavior of public 
employees to the DOJ for investigation.  Finally, the DOJ can be called in to handle cases 
that require an unusual amount of resources or special supervisory assistance.   
 
In each year, generally about half of the federal corruption convictions involve federal 
public officials.  One such high-profile case was a former Supervisory Deputy U.S.  
Marshal in Colorado, who was prosecuted by the DOJ and convicted of perjury in 
relation to false statements made in the 1997 trial of Timothy McVeigh.   Another quarter 
of the federal convictions are state or local officials, and the remaining cases are private 
citizens involved in public corruption cases.  For example, in 2002 six police officers in 
Alabama were convicted of extortion and soliciting bribes from individuals detained by 
the police department in exchange for not pursuing criminal charges against them.   
Election fraud is also a priority of the DOJ.  In 1999, an individual was convicted of 
using fraudulent means to make illegal excessive contributions to a senator’s reelection 
campaign. 
 
Does this variable meaningfully measure corruption?   Table 1 ranks corruption levels by 
state for the ten most and least corruption states.  To us, this list lines up reasonably well 
with our preconceived notions about the areas in the U.S. that are more corruption.  
Mississippi and Louisiana are among our most corrupt states.  New Hampshire and 
Oregon are among the least corrupt states.  While this measure is imperfect, it has distinct 
advantages over the existing survey-based measures of corruption.    
Our data on state demographics, educational attainment, income and housing values, 
come from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses.   Our regressions also include data on the 
fraction of the workforce that is unionized, which is reported for 1996 in the 1997-98 
edition of the State and Metropolitan Area Databook.   
 
Corruption and State Characteristics 
 
We now turn to the correlates of corruption.  Our first approach is to regress: 
 
(1)  Controls Other  Education b Income a Rate   Conviction + · + · =  
 
In all regressions, we include controls for the logarithm of state population, unionization, 
the share of the state that works in manufacturing, and dummy variables for each of the 
four Census regions.  Our core income variable is the logarithm of median household 
income in the state from the 1990 census.  Our core education variable is the share of the 
population with no schooling after high school.   
 
The first column of Table 2 shows regression results controlling for income, but not 
education.  In that specification, a higher income level depresses corruption.  The 
coefficient estimate indicates that a .1 log point increase in median income 
(approximately 10 percent) is associated with .4 fewer convictions per 100,000 
inhabitants, or about one fifth of the standard deviation of corruption rates across states.  
In this specification, southern states and states with a higher fraction of unionized 
workers have more corruption convictions.  These positive correlations correspond to 
conventional wisdom concerning the types of areas that tend to be more corrupt.  
However, as neither of these effects remain after controlling for education, we don’t 
believe that they are particularly meaningful.   
 
On the other hand, the share of the labor force in manufacturing reduces the amount of 
corruption convictions and this result is robust in the majority of our specifications.  A ten percent increase in the share of the labor force in manufacturing reduces corruption 
convictions by 1.6 per 100,000 or about three quarters of a standard deviation.  One 
potential explanation is that states with more manufacturing were richer earlier in the 
century and that they used this wealth to invest in institutions that reduced corruption.     
 
In regression shown in column 2, we replace the income variable with a measure of the 
level of education in the state, which we define as the fraction of the population with no 
more than a high school degree.  The impact of education on corruption convictions is 
quite strong and much more robust than the impact of income on corruption convictions.  
This can be seen in column 3, which shows that when we control for both education and 
income, only education remains significant.  As the share of people with only a high 
school degree or less declines by 10 percent, the corruption conviction rate decreases by 
2, or about one standard deviation.  Therefore, a higher level of schooling is strongly 
associated with a lower corruption conviction rates.  Once the effect of education is taken 
into account, the South no longer appears to have more corruption than other regions.  
 
As education levels may themselves be the result, not the cause, of lower corruption 
levels, in column 4, we use high school enrollment rates in 1928 from Goldin (1998) as 
an instrument for schooling attainment today.  Education levels have a great deal of 
permanence and this variable strongly predicts current education levels (the coefficient 
from the first stage is -.23 with a standard error of .07, and the first stage F is 16.9).  
Using this instrument, effect of education on corruption remains significant and its value 
is almost unchanged form the ordinary least squares specifications.   
 
In a final attempt to deal with the reverse causality between education and corruption, we 
use the share of church members in the state that are Congregationalist, which is 
available for 45 states in the 1890 Census.  Congregationalism was almost never a 
dominant religion during this time period, but it is generally associated with elites and 
their commitment to education.  As a result, education developed more quickly in those 
states with more Congregationalists and those states remain more educated today.  In 
regression (5), where we use Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for schooling today, we continue to estimate an effect of schooling that is similar in magnitude to the 
effects estimated in regressions (2) and (3), lending further support to the idea that places 
with more schooling have less corruption.  Of course, because Congregationalism may 
influence corruption through channels other than schooling, there is a reasonable 
argument that it is a flawed instrument.   
 
Finally, again to address reverse causality, we instrument for household income.  In 
regression (6), we instrument for median household income in 1990 using median family 
wage and salary income from the 1940 Census (calculated from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata).   In regression (7), we predict income using the geographic location of each 
state.  Geographic characteristics, such as access to a natural harbor or an easily 
navigable river, can greatly reduce transportation costs and cause economic activity to be 
more productive.  Therefore, proximity to an ocean or major river is strongly correlated 
with income (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003).  As a proxy for proximity to the coasts, we 
use quadratic functions of latitude and longitude as a second set of instruments for 
income.  Using either lagged income or geography as an instrument, the coefficient on 
income is larger magnitude than in the OLS regression and at least marginally 
statistically significant.
3  These results further suggest to us that greater economic 
development reduces corruption.   
. 
In Table 3, we turn to the role of income and racial heterogeneity.  All of the regressions 
include our basic controls, education and the logarithm of income, but the coefficients on 
these variables are not reported.  The coefficient on education remains statistically 
significant in all of these specifications.  Measures of income inequality are calculated 
from the 1990 Current Population Survey.  Using data on total household income, we 
estimate state-specific Gini coefficients using the fraction of income earned by each 
decile of the income distribution.  In regression (1) of this table, we find that more 
income inequality increases corruption but that the effect is weak.  
 
                                                 
3 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from regression (6) because they were not states in 1940 and so were not 
included in the 1940 Census.  They are also excluded from regression (7) because they are not part of the 
continental United States. In regression (2), we use the ratio of household income at the 75
th percentile to household 
income at the 25
th percentile to capture income inequality.  In this case, we find that there 
is more corruption in more unequal places.  As this ratio increases by .4 (which is about 
equal to the standard deviation across states), the number of corruption convictions per 
100,000 increases by .8. 
 
In regression (3), we turn to racial dissimilarity.  In that regression, we find that 
corruption convictions increase with the share of the population that is Black and 
decrease with the share of the population that is Hispanic.  The former effect is 
statistically significant; the latter effect is not.  As the share of the population that is 
Black rises by 10 percent, the number of corruption convictions per 100,000 rises by 1.   
 
In regression (4), we use a more common measure of racial fractionalization: an index 
that is defined as 1-￿si
2, where si is the population share of group i.  The index is 
calculated from the population shares of the following racial and ethnic categories: 
Hispanic (all races), White, Black, Asian, Native American, and other races.  In this 
regression, we find that the impact of racial fractionalization is insignificant.  This 
insignificance is driven primarily by a few states that have a large Hispanic population 
and low corruption levels.  In regression (5), we exclude New Mexico (the state with the 
highest fraction of Hispanics) and the impact of racial fragmentation becomes statistically 
significant.  These results suggest that fragmentation has a weak positive effect on the 
level of corruption convictions in the state.   
 
Finally, in Table 4, we turn to the role of government.  The first four regressions examine 
general measures of government size.  In regression (1), we use gross state product of 
state and local government in 1990 relative to total gross state product, which is 
estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  In regression (2), we use the number of 
state legislators per capita in 1997, which comes from the Report on Economic Freedom 
published by Clemson University.  In regression (3), we use data on state and local 
expenditures per capita in 1995, as reported in the 1997-98 edition of the State and 
Metropolitan Area Databook.  In regression (4), we use average tax burden in 1994, defined as total state tax revenues as a percent of personal income, which again comes 
from the Report on Economic Freedom published by Clemson University.   None of these 
measures have any correlation with the level of corruption. 
 
In regression (5) and (6), we use measures of general state regulation that are also taken 
from Clemson’s Economic Freedom report.  The index of regulation includes information 
on labor regulation, environmental regulation, and regulation in particular industries such 
as public utilities and insurance.  This regulation index is not correlated with corruption.  
We also use this study’s assessment of general economic freedom, which includes the 
measures of regulation and government size mentioned above, as well as many other 
indicators of government spending, taxation, and the judicial system.  This measure is 
also uncorrelated with corruption.   
 
Finally, in regression (7), we estimate the effect of state-level laws that are specifically 
designed to limit corruption.  In particular, we use a state ranking of integrity created by 
the Better Government Association, which takes into account freedom of information 
laws, whistleblower protection laws, campaign finance laws, gifts, trips and honoraria 
laws, and conflict of interest laws.  This data is reported by the Corporate Crime Reporter 
(2004).  This regression shows that states with stricter anti-corruption laws have fewer 
corruption convictions, so these laws appear to have an effect of dampening corruption. 
 
Overall, the results on government give no support to the view that bigger governments 
or governments with more regulation are more corrupt.  Of course, this non-finding might 
reflect the fact that people in more corrupt states are more opposed to bigger government.  
There is, however, a weak association between laws that are meant to prevent corruption 
and lower corruption levels.  While this result is provocative, there are many 
unobservable state characteristics that might explain this correlation.   
 
Other researchers have also estimated the effect of local government on the number of 
federal corruption convictions by state, with mixed results.  Fisman and Gatti (2002) also 
find no meaningful relationship between government size and corruption.  On the other hand, Goel and Nelson (1998) find that state and local expenditures increase corruption 
after controlling for police expenditures and other factors that deter corruption.  Besides 
examining the effect of government size, Fisman and Gatti find that state corruption 
convictions are positively related to the amount of federal transfers.  They interpret this 
result as suggesting that a decentralized government is less corrupt.  An alternative 
interpretation is that states with poorer fiscal policy, and therefore higher expenditures 
compared with revenues, have an environment that is conducive to corrupt practices.  
Combining our results with this other research, we conclude that endogeneity problems 
make any effect of government on corruption difficult to assess.  An important direction 
of future work is to use panel data or other more credible identification strategies to 
explore this relationship further.    
   
IV.  Does Corruption Impact State Growth 
 
In this section, we ask whether growth is slower in states with more corruption 
convictions.  Following the literature on local economic growth (e.g. Glaeser and Saiz, 
2004), we use population, income and housing value growth to measure local 
development.  We have examined growth in these variables between 1980-2000 and 
between 1990-2000 and the results are generally similar.  We focus on the results for the 
1990-2000 period due to the timing of the data on corruption.   
 
One problem with the regressions estimated below is that corruption is measured during 
the 1990s and not during some previous time period.  This problem also plagues many of 
the international growth regressions that use corruption (e.g. Mauro, 1995), so while it 
might be preferable to have measures of corruption for some period prior to the 1990s, 
comparability with prior research makes it appropriate to use the contemporaneous data. 
 
Our basic specification is: 
 
(2)  stics Characteri   State   Initial Rate   Conviction
1990 in    Outcome
2000 in    Outcome





￿ b a Log ,  
where “Outcome in 2000” and “Outcome in 1990” refers to the levels of income, 
population and median housing values in both of those years.  We are interested in the 
estimate of b , the relationship between corruption and growth over this time period.  In 
all specifications, we will always include initial values for the three key dependent 
variables, as well as regional dummies.  In more complete specifications, we will add 
racial fractionalization and unionization.   
  
In the first regression of Table 5, we find that states with more corruption convictions 
have modestly lower levels of employment growth.  One extra conviction per 100,000 
reduces employment growth by less than one percent over the decade.  This result is 
statistically significant, but after controlling for racial fractionalization and unionization, 
the coefficient falls in half and becomes insignificant.   
 
In the third and fourth regressions, we look at the connection between corruption 
convictions and income growth. One extra conviction per 100,000 reduces employment 
growth by about one-half of one percent over the decade.  Again, the result is not robust 
to including other controls.  In the context of an analysis concerning legal institutions and 
economic growth, Berkowitz and Clay (2003) find that the level of state corruption 
convictions has a negative impact on household income and poverty rates.  This evidence 
is consistent with our results, although they do not demonstrate that the effect is robust to 
controlling for other state characteristics.  Finally, in the last two regressions in the table, 
we find that there is little correlation between corruption and changes in property values.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have supplemented the international evidence on the causes of 
consequences of corruption by using data on corruption convictions across U.S. states.  
We have found that many of the basic patterns that hold for countries, hold for states as 
well, even when corruption is defined on the basis of convictions rather than opinion 
surveys (which is the norm in the cross-country literature).  States with higher per capita income, and more education are generally less corrupt.  States with more ethnic 
heterogeneity and income inequality are more corrupt.  There is little relationship 
between the size of government and corruption and little connection between measures of 
regulation and corruption.  There is a modest negative connection between corruption and 
state economic growth, which becomes statistically insignificant once we control for a 
rich enough set of covariates.  
 
Taken together, these results support the view put forth in Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopes-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2004) that development improves political institutions rather than 
political institutions determining development.  Historical levels of education, including 
high school graduation rates in 1928 and Congregationalism in 1850, predict less 
corruption today.  Per capita income in 1940 strongly predicts less corruption convictions 
today.  However, the connection between corruption and current economic development 
is weak.    
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States with Most and Least Convictions per Capita 
Most Convictions  Fewest Convictions 
State  Convictions per 
100,000 pop 
State  Convictions per 
100,000 pop 
Mississippi  9.19  Kansas  2.01 
Louisiana  8.95  Arkansas  1.99 
North Dakota  8.27  Arizona  1.98 
Montana  7.41  Wisconsin  1.91 
Alaska  6.97  Iowa  1.65 
Illinois  6.88  Minnesota  1.59 
Florida  6.62  Utah  1.52 
South Dakota  6.62  New Hampshire  1.30 
New York  6.04  Oregon  .99 
Ohio  5.88  Nebraska  .79 Table 2 
Effect of Income and Education on Corruption 
    OLS      IV     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Ln(Income)  -3.89* 
(1.96) 
  -.27 
(2.36) 




Share with HS 
degree or less 








   






































































































Adj. R2  .15  .26  .24  .30  .37  .15  .19 
# Obs.  50  50  50  50  45  48  48 
Note.  Except where noted, all dependent variables are from the 1990 Census.  Income is measured as 
median household income in the state.  Low education is defined as the share of the population 25 and 
older whose highest level of education is a high-school degree or less.  Unionization rate is in 1996 from 
the State and Metropolitan Data Book.  The IV regression in column 5 instruments for low education with 
the state high school graduation rate in 1928 (Goldin, 1998).  Column 6 instruments with the share of 
Congregationalist churches in 1850.  Column 7 instruments for 1990 income with 1940 family income 
from the Census. 
 Table 3 
Effect of Income Inequality and Racial Heterogeneity on Corruption 










  2.11** 
(.90) 
     
Share Black      11.2** 
(4.95) 
   
Share 
Hispanic 
    -8.42 
(5.40) 
   
Racial 
Dissimilarity 




Adj. R2  .26  .32  .38  .25  .34 
# Obs.  50  50  50  50  49 
Note.  Results are from an OLS regression. Income inequality measures are from the 1990 Current 
Population Survey.  Racial dissimilarity is a fractionalization index equal to 1 - Ssi
2, where si is the 
population shares for the following racial/ethnic groups: Hispanic (all races), Black, Asian, Native 
American, and other races.  All regressions control for ln(income), the share of the population with a high 
school degree or less, ln(population), unionization, share of manufacturing employment, and Census 
regions.  See notes to Table 2 for details. 
 Table 4 
Effect of Government Size and Regulation on Corruption 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 






           
State Legislators 
per Capita 
  .063 
(.082) 
         
Expenditures per 
Capita 
    -.659 
(.780) 
       
Tax Revenues / 
Per Capita Income 
      -26.0 
(21.4) 
     
Regulation Index          -.480 
(.586) 
   
General Economic 
Freedom 
          .532 
(.552) 
 
State Integrity              -.038* 
(.020) 
Adj. R2  .38  .37  .39  .39  .37  .38  .29 
# Obs.  50  50  50  50  50  50  50 
Note.  Results are from an OLS regression. Relative state and local GSP is the 1990 value of state and local 
gross state product relative to total state GSP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Expenditures per 
capita are from the 1997-98 edition of the State and Metropolitan Area Databook.  All variables in the 
remaining rows are from Clemson’s report on Economic Freedom.  All regressions control for ln(income), 
the share of the population with a high school degree or less, ln(population), unionization, share of 
manufacturing employment, and Census regions.  See notes to Table 2 for details. Table 5 
Effect of Corruption on Economic Growth 1990-2000 
  Employment  Income  Housing Prices 














  -.065 
(.094) 
  -.080 
(.048) 




  -.425** 
(.207) 
  -.284** 
(.106) 
  .242 
(.281) 






















































































Adj. R2  .53  .55  .64  .69  .82  .84 
# Obs.  50  50  50  50  50  50 
Note.  Each column shows a separate regression with the dependent variable equal to the growth rate of the 
variable named in the column heading.  The corruption rate pertains to an average over 1990-2002 and the 
unionization rate is for 1996.  All other independent variables pertain to 1990. 
 
 Appendix Table 1 








Mississippi  9.19   257  2708937 
Louisiana  8.95   384  4344474 
North Dakota  8.27    53  588488 
Montana  7.41    64  640500 
Alaska  6.97    42  14460152 
Illinois  6.88   857  11924948 
Florida  6.62   933  850630 
South Dakota  6.62    50  725424 
New York  6.04  1011  3863532 
Ohio  5.88   655  18483456 
Kentucky  5.82   214  724884 
Tennessee  5.46   275  11100128 
Hawaii  5.35    61  1159883 
Virginia  5.01   309  1150351 
Georgia  4.91   312  4243844 
Pennsylvania  4.77   554  8072269 
Delaware  4.41    32  12081348 
New Jersey  4.31   353  5283234 
Wyoming  4.22    20  5356142 
Missouri  4.20   215  7332334 
Alabama  4.19   183  1600045 
Rhode Island  4.19    39  6632936 
Idaho  4.17    50  1025892 
Maine  3.92    48  3749358 
South Carolina  3.73   160  31815834 
California  3.70  1182  3298120 
West Virginia  3.66    63  18919164 
Oklahoma  3.30   115  473685 
Massachusetts  3.29   187  6182761 
Texas  3.08   580  1251426 
Connecticut  2.90   103  1800910 
Nevada  2.87    41  3346340 
New Mexico  2.84    46  2582996 
Michigan  2.62   252  5812322 
Vermont  2.39    11  585792 
Indiana  2.37   134  9616870 
Washington  2.34   110  7338975 
Maryland  2.32   118  5380406 
North Carolina  2.21   143  1667058 
Colorado  2.08    54  4397930 Kansas  2.01    51  5038977 
Arkansas  1.99    47  5127722 
Arizona  1.98    87  2512062 
Wisconsin  1.91   101  1978010 
Iowa  1.65    46  3797828 
Minnesota  1.59    65  4647289 
Utah  1.52    30  2851540 
New Hampshire  1.28    14  1172519 
Oregon  0.99    36  3131860 
Nebraska  0.79    11  1644824 
 